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Learning-by-doing in torts: Liability and information about accident technology

Florian Baumann and Tim Friehe

No 194, DICE Discussion Papers from Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Abstract: In the economic analysis of liability law, information about accident risk and how it can be influenced by precautions is commonly taken for granted. However, a profound understanding of the relationship between care and accident risk often requires learning-by-doing. In a two-period model, we examine the implications for the optimal level of care and behavior under strict liability and negligence, showing that liability law may not induce efficient incentives.

Keywords: liability rules; care incentives; accident technology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D83 K13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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