Equilibrium selection with coupled populations in hawk-dove games: Theory and experiment in continuous time

Volker Benndorf, Ismael Martínez-Martínez and Hans-Theo Normann

No 222, DICE Discussion Papers from Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Abstract: Standard one- and two-population models for evolutionary games are the limit cases of a uniparametric family combining intra- and intergroup interactions. Our setup interpolates between both extremes with a coupling parameter k. For the example of the hawk-dove game, we analyze the replicator dynamics of the coupled model. We confirm the existence of a bifurcation in the dynamics of the system and identify three regions for equilibrium selection, one of which does not appear in common one- and two-population models. We also design a continuous-time experiment, exploring the dynamics and the equilibrium selection. The data largely confirm the theory.

Keywords: evolutionary game theory; experiment in continuous time; hawk-dove game; replicator dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C73 C91 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Journal Article: Equilibrium selection with coupled populations in hawk–dove games: Theory and experiment in continuous time (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:dicedp:222

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