Perceived fairness and consequences of affirmative action policies

Hannah Schildberg-Hörisch, Chi Trieu () and Jana Willrodt
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Hannah Schildberg-Hoerisch ()

No 338, DICE Discussion Papers from Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Abstract: Debates about affirmative action often revolve around fairness. Accordingly, we document substantial heterogeneity in the fairness perception of various affirmative action policies. But do these differences translate into different consequences? In a laboratory experiment, we study three different quota rules that favor individuals whose performance is low, either due to bad luck (discrimination), low productivity, or choice of a short working time. Higher fairness perceptions coincide with a higher willingness to compete and less retaliation against winners. No policy harms overall efficiency or post-competition teamwork. Furthermore, individuals seem to internalize the normbehind the policies that are perceived as fairest.

Keywords: affirmative action; fairness ideals; experiment; tournament; real effort (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D02 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Perceived Fairness and Consequences of Affirmative Action Policies (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:dicedp:338

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