Algorithmic and human collusion
Tobias Werner
No 372, DICE Discussion Papers from Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Abstract:
As self-learning pricing algorithms become popular, there are growing concerns among academics and regulators that algorithms could learn to collude tacitly on non-competitive prices and thereby harm competition. I study popular reinforcement learning algorithms and show that they develop collusive behavior in a simulated market environment. To derive a counterfactual that resembles traditional tacit collusion, I conduct market experiments with human participants in the same environment. Across different treatments, I vary the market size and the number of firms that use a self-learned pricing algorithm. I provide evidence that oligopoly markets can become more collusive if algorithms make pricing decisions instead of humans. In two-firm markets, market prices are weakly increasing in the number of algorithms in the market. In three-firm markets, algorithms weaken competition if most firms use an algorithm and human sellers are inexperienced.
Keywords: Artificial Intelligence; Collusion; Experiment; Human-Machine Interaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D83 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-big, nep-cmp, nep-com, nep-exp, nep-ind and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:dicedp:372
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