Are dyads conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment

Andrea Morone and Tiziana Temerario

EconStor Preprints from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Abstract: We analysed dyads strategies in one-shot public goods game. By means of a laboratory experiment, using a variant of the strategy-method, we found that more than one third of the dyads are conditional cooperators, whereas 18% can be categorised as free riders.

Keywords: Voluntary contributions; Conditional cooperation; Free riding; Strategy-method (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Are dyads conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:esprep:148356

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