Competing Combinatorial Auctions

Thomas Kittsteiner, Marion Ott and Richard Steinberg

EconStor Preprints from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Keywords: Auctioneer competition; Combinatorial auctions; VCG mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-des, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-reg
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Journal Article: Competing Combinatorial Auctions (2022)
Journal Article: Competing Combinatorial Auctions (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:esprep:171995

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