Corruption, political stability and illicit financial outflows in Sub-Saharan Africa

Emmanuel Orkoh, Carike Claassen and Derick Blaauw

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Abstract: This paper examines the effect of corruption control and political stability on illicit financial outflows in Sub-Saharan Africa. We use a balanced panel data from the World Bank, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and Global Financial Integrity on Sub-Saharan African countries covering the period 2005-2014. Our regression estimates reveal that a unit increase in political stability and corruption control reduce illicit financial outflow due to misinvoicing in merchandise trade by an average of US$ 20.5 million and US$ 44.3 million respectively. The results also show that high trade rating, financial sector rating and exchange rates reduce illicit financial outflows while an increase in foreign direct investment and inflation increase illicit financial outflow. We recommend that governments in Sub-Saharan Africa countries must ensure that institutions responsible for fighting corruption and enhancing stable governance are well empowered and given the needed resources to work effectively to reduce corruption to the barest minimum.

Keywords: Corruption; political stability; illicit financial outflow; Sub-Saharan Africa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Corruption, political stability and illicit financial outflows in Sub-Saharan Africa (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:esprep:182082

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