Risk mitigating versus risk shifting: Evidence from banks security trading in crises

Jose-Luis Peydro, Andrea Polo, Enrico Sette and Victoria Vanasco

EconStor Preprints from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Abstract: We show that risk-mitigating incentives dominate risk-shifting incentives in fragile banks. We study security trading by banks, as banks can easily and quickly change their risk exposure within their security portfolio. For identification, we exploit different crisis shocks and supervisory ISIN-bank-month-level data. Less capitalized banks take relatively less risk after financial stress shocks. Results hold within identical regulatory capital risk weights categories. Moreover, additional tests suggest that banks’ own incentives, rather than supervision, are the main drivers. Results hold for the different crisis shocks since 2007/08, including the COVID-19 one. A model of bank behavior rationalizes our findings.

Keywords: risk shifting; financial crises; securities; bank capital; reach for yield; uncertainty; risk weights; supervision; franchise value; COVID-19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G00 G01 G21 G28 G30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cfn and nep-eec
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Risk mitigating versus risk shifting: evidence from banks security trading in crises (2023)
Working Paper: Risk Mitigating versus Risk Shifting: Evidence from Banks Security Trading in Crises (2020)
Working Paper: Risk Mitigating versus Risk Shifting: Evidence from Banks Security Trading in Crises (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:esprep:226219

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3732831

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