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The Good of Rules: An experimental study on prosocial behavior

Maurizio Caserta, Rosaria Distefano and Livio Ferrante

EconStor Preprints from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Abstract: In everyday life, individuals interact with relatives, friends and colleagues, share ideas and passions and cooperate with others to pursue common goals. Within each social domain, individuals recognize themselves as a group member with rights and duties to observe. Understanding the importance of social norms and encouraging mutually beneficial cooperation is crucial for societal and economic development. This paper presents an experimental study of an educational program for early adolescents of 11 years old from South Italy. The program introduces participants to institutions, civic engagement, sense of duty, and decision-making. Among other didactic activities, it includes guided tours and a role-taking game. Our results suggest that the program attendance positively affects cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma and altruistic behavior in a Dictator Game. Our findings contribute to the nature-nurture debate, showing that promoting prosocial behavior can be effective in pursing the common good.

Keywords: Experimental game theory; Group Decision Making; Cooperation; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Dictator Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C93 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:esprep:266393

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