Do Eurozone Countries Cheat with their Budget Deficit Forecasts?

Andreas Stephan and Tilman Brück

No 2005,5, Working Paper Series from European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), The Postgraduate Research Programme Capital Markets and Finance in the Enlarged Europe

Abstract: We estimate the political economy determinants of budget deficit forecast errors. Since the adoption of the Stability Pact, Eurozone governments have manipulated forecasts before elections. The political orientation and the institutional design of governments also affects the quality of forecasts.

Keywords: fiscal policy; budget deficit; forecast error; electoral cycles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 C53 E62 H62 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Do Eurozone Countries Cheat with their Budget Deficit Forecasts? (2006)
Working Paper: Do Eurozone Countries Cheat with Their Budget Deficit Forecasts? (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:euvgra:20055

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