The influence of social capital on CEO dismissal in Germany: an empirical analysis

Markus Wrage, Anja Tuschke and Rudi K. F. Bresser

No 2011/5, Discussion Papers from Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics

Abstract: In this study, we address the question of why some CEOs stay in office during a performance downturn while others don't. Based on a social capital perspective we assume that (1) the social capital endowment of an underperforming CEO may reduce the risk of getting dismissed and that (2) the tendency of board members to dismiss the CEO is moderated by their own social capital. Using data of large German corporations, we find support for our assumptions regarding the influence of a CEO's social capital on the risk of getting dismissed. We find partial evidence for a moderating effect of the social capital of board members. Our findings' implications for the literatures on social capital and CEO turnover are discussed.

Keywords: CEO turnover; board interlocks; social capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-eur and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:20115

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (econstor@zbw-workspace.eu).