Collusion and delegation under information control

Andreas Asseyer

No 2020/3, Discussion Papers from Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics

Abstract: This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. I consider a model in which the principal designs the supervisor's signal on the productive agent's private information and the supervisor and agent may collude. I show that the principal optimally delegates the interaction with the agent to the supervisor if either the supervisor's budget is large or the value of production is small. The principal prefers direct communication with the supervisor and agent if the supervisor's budget is sufficiently small and the value of production is high.

Keywords: Collusion; Information design; Delegation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 D83 D86 H57 M55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:20203

DOI: 10.17169/refubium-26337

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