Unionised dockworkers and port ownership structure in an international oligopoly

Nicola Meccheri ()

No 1326, GLO Discussion Paper Series from Global Labor Organization (GLO)

Abstract: In an international duopoly with two markets and two ports, this paper investigates the role of dockworkers unionisation in affecting welfare outcomes under public and private ports, as well as in determining the endogenous choice by governments of port ownership structure. While private ports maximise profits, public ports maximise domestic welfare and face a budget constraint, which is binding when unions are suf- ficiently wage-oriented and shipping costs are not too high. Consumer surplus, total wage bill and domestic welfare are generally higher under public ownership, especially when unions are wage-oriented. The opposite holds true for firm profits, whilst privati- sation always increases port profits. Moreover, relative to endogenous port ownership structures, state-owned ports appear as the most likely equilibrium result although all possible configurations may arise in equilibrium, including an asymmetric structure with a state-owned port and a private port.

Keywords: unionised dockworkers; port ownership structure; international duopoly; welfare outcomes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F16 J51 L33 R48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-lab and nep-tre
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Journal Article: Unionised dockworkers and port ownership structure in an international oligopoly (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:glodps:1326

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