EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Moral hazard in VC finance: More expensive than you thought

Julius Tennert, Marie Lambert and Hans-Peter Burghof

No 02-2017, Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences from University of Hohenheim, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences

Abstract: Venture projects are fraught with exogenous market risk and endogenous agency risk. We apply a real options perspective to analyze the investment decision of the venture capitalist (VC) in this set-up. The solutions presented are conflictive: the VC reduces his exposure to exogenous risk by delaying investments to wait for informational updates (delay option), but he mitigates endogenous risk by advancing investments to discover entrepreneur's effort. So far, papers focus on the optimal timing of investments considering independence of exogenous and endogenous risk. We show that interdependence of exogenous risk and endogenous risk exists. We find that endogenous risk prompts the VC to accelerate the discovery process when exogenous risk is high, and to abandon the delay option when it is most valuable.

Keywords: Venture Capital; Real Option; Agency Cost; Moral Hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D53 G11 G12 G24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn and nep-ent
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/155310/1/881129569.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:hohdps:022017

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences from University of Hohenheim, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:zbw:hohdps:022017