Fördern und fordern in der Wohnungspolitik: Wissenschaft und Praxis im Dissens über stille Reserven von Wohnungsbaugenossenschaften

Michael Braun Alexander

No 01-24, IBF Paper Series from IBF – Institut für Bank- und Finanzgeschichte / Institute for Banking and Financial History, Frankfurt am Main

Abstract: Public housing policy has given housing cooperatives above-average market shares, in some cases. This was achieved despite the fact that the sponsor, believing that he was doing good, even temporarily slowed down the independent development of his target. The case study of Hochtaunusbau shows that public funding can be at the expense of the cooperatives. The public sponsor, in this case the city, also prevented market-based incentive systems, such as dividends. The cooperative saw this as a brake on its equity formation. After all, the good location, close to the Taunus and close to the financial center of Frankfurt am Main, has led to high hidden reserves. The cooperative can hardly make use of this, either to give members a greater share in the cooperative's profits or to offer more members an apartment through new construction. It essentially saw itself as a portfolio holder. Evidence from the science of cooperatives, according to which the reserves of a cooperative can certainly be divided, is not accepted in practice. And public sponsors continue to provide funds. They do not demand that cooperatives use their hidden reserves for the cooperative purpose.

JEL-codes: D22 L85 N94 P13 R38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ger, nep-hme and nep-inv
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