Tougher educational exam leading to worse selection

Eduardo de Carvalho Andrade and Luciano I. de Castro

No 2011-2, Economics Discussion Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: A parallel of education with transformative processes in standard markets suggest that a more severe control of the quality of the output will improve the overall quality of the education. This paper shows a somehow counterintuitive result: an increase in the exam difficulty may reduce the average quality (productivity) of selected individuals. Since the exam does not verify all skills, when its standard rises, candidates with relatively low skills emphasized in the test and high skills demanded in the job may no longer qualify. Hence, an increase in the testing standard may be counterproductive. One implication is that policies should emphasize alignment between the skills tested and those required in the actual jobs, rather than increase exams' difficulties.

Keywords: school standards; signaling model; cognitive skills; non-cognitive skills (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I2 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-lab and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/44432/1/644788879.pdf (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:20112

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