Conflict in the wage-led growth model

Romar Correa

No 2014-41, Economics Discussion Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: We model the interaction between capitalists and entrepreneurs as a dynamic game. The open-loop Nash equilibrium and the closed-loop Nash equilibrium are distinguished. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution as well as the level and responsiveness of the wage rate to the accumulation of capital are shown to be important for wage-led growth.

Keywords: capital accumulation; conflict: cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B51 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ent and nep-hme
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/103209/1/799013692.pdf (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201441

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