Nash equilibria in all-pay auctions with discrete strategy space

Zheng Li

No 2017-22, Economics Discussion Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: Using two-player all-pay auctions, the author fully characterizes the Nash equilibrium under a discrete bidding strategy space. In particular, he shows that under the random tiebreaking rule, the cardinality of the set of Nash equilibrium depends on the parity of the reward size and a continuum of Nash equilibria exists. Additionally, when a simple favorone-sided tie-breaking rule is used, the equilibrium solution becomes independent of the reward size.

Keywords: asymmetric Nash equilibrium; all-pay auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-dcm, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201722

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