Social limits to redistribution and conspicuous norms

Luca Ferrari

No 2018-30, Economics Discussion Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: In this article the author considers an economy in which individuals are matched into pairs and the desirability of an individual depends on her position on the distribution of wealth. The author assumes that individuals show their relative standing by consuming a conspicuous good and he shows that there exist different social norms supporting different matching arrangements. In addition, individuals have to vote over a redistributive policy and the author shows that, despite the desirability of the full redistributive outcomes, under some economic conditions the medium class is able to match with the higher class in exchange of a minimum level of redistribution of wealth which keeps the lower class far from economic and social opportunities.

Keywords: social status; conspicuous consumption; matching; redistribution of wealth; income inequality; social organizations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D31 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/176688/1/1016736541.pdf (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201830

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