Rethinking Global Climate Change Governance

Scott Barrett

No 2008-31, Economics Discussion Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: This paper explains why the approach taken so far to mitigate global climate change has failed. The central reason is an inability to enforce targets and timetables. Current proposals recommending even stricter emission limits will not help unless they are able to address the enforcement deficit. Trade restrictions are one means for doing so, but trade restrictions pose new problems, particularly if they are applied to enforce economy-wide emission limitation agreements. This paper sketches a different approach that unpacks the climate problem, addressing different gases and sectors using different instruments. It also explains how a failure to address the climate problem fundamentally will only create incentives for different kinds of responses, posing different challenges for climate change governance

Keywords: Climate change; Kyoto protocol; enforcement; trade restrictions; R&D (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F18 F51 F53 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-env
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/27467/1/dp2008-31.pdf (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:7407

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