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Discounting Behavior in Problem Gambling

Patrick Ring, Catharina C. Probst, Levent Neyse, Stephan Wolff, Christian Kaernbach, Thilo van Eimeren and Ulrich Schmidt

Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: Problem gamblers discount delayed rewards more rapidly than do non-gambling controls. Understanding this impulsivity is important for developing treatment options. In this article, we seek to make two contributions: First, we ask which of the currently debated economic models of intertemporal choice (exponential versus hyperbolic versus quasi-hyperbolic) provides the best description of gamblers’ discounting behavior. Second, we ask how problem gamblers differ from habitual gamblers and non-gambling controls within the most favored parametrization. Our analysis reveals that the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model is strongly favored over the other two parametrizations. Within the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model, problem gamblers have both a significantly stronger present bias and a smaller long-run discount factor, which suggests that gamblers’ impulsivity has two distinct sources.

Keywords: time preferences; discounting; risk; incentives; gambling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-isf and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwkie:240211

DOI: 10.1007/s10899-021-10054-x

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