The tactical utilization of cognitive biases in negotiations
Alexander Rhode,
Avo Schönbohm and
Jacobus van Vliet
No 80, Working Papers from Berlin School of Economics and Law, Institute of Management Berlin (IMB)
Abstract:
The present paper conceptualizes the domain of psychological influence in negotiations and thereby proposes seven negotiations tactics which utilize the findings of cognitive bias research. After reviewing existing literature on cognitive biases in negotiations, the paper argues that their persuasive utilization in negotiations has not been discussed extensively so far. Inspired by the research findings on anchoring in negotiations, the paper develops tactics which alter information sets of counterparties in such a way that their decision making becomes biased, but leave their incentive structures untouched. The theoretical foundations of these value-claiming tactics are accompanied by short examples, where bargainers play on the cognitive biases of their counterparties to sell proposals and persuade reluctant counterparties. The authors thus explain the effectiveness of widely used negotiation tactics and allow a greater understanding of negotiators' decision making processes and provide recommendations for practitioners.
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-neu
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:imbwps:80
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