Fifty shades of QE: Conflicts of interest in economic research

Brian Fabo, Martina Jančoková, Elisabeth Kempf and Lubos Pastor

No 147, IMFS Working Paper Series from Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS)

Abstract: Central banks sometimes evaluate their own policies. To assess the inherent conflict of interest, we compare the research findings of central bank researchers and academic economists regarding the macroeconomic effects of quantitative easing (QE). We find that central bank papers report larger effects of QE on output and inflation. Central bankers are also more likely to report significant effects of QE on output and to use more positive language in the abstract. Central bankers who report larger QE effects on output experience more favorable career outcomes. A survey of central banks reveals substantial involvement of bank management in research production.

JEL-codes: A11 E52 E58 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac, nep-mon and nep-sog
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/228631/1/1744661936.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Fifty Shades of QE: Conflicts of Interest in Economic Research (2020)
Working Paper: Fifty Shades of QE: Conflicts of Interest in Economic Research (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:imfswp:147

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