The political economy of bank bailouts

Markus Behn, Rainer Haselmann (), Thomas Kick and Vikrant Vig

No 86, IMFS Working Paper Series from Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS)

Abstract: In this paper, we examine how the institutional design affects the outcome of bank bailout decisions. In the German savings bank sector, distress events can be resolved by local politicians or a state-level association. We show that decisions by local politicians with close links to the bank are distorted by personal considerations: While distress events per se are not related to the electoral cycle, the probability of local politicians injecting taxpayers' money into a bank in distress is 30 percent lower in the year directly preceding an election. Using the electoral cycle as an instrument, we show that banks that are bailed out by local politicians experience less restructuring and perform considerably worse than banks that are supported by the savings bank association. Our findings illustrate that larger distance between banks and decision makers reduces distortions in the decision making process, which has implications for the design of bank regulation and supervision.

Keywords: political economy; bailouts; state-owned enterprises; elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/108939/1/821349058.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The political economy of bank bailouts (2016)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Bank Bailouts (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:imfswp:86

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IMFS Working Paper Series from Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().