The fiscal-monetary nexus in Germany

Dirk Ehnts

No 138/2020, IPE Working Papers from Berlin School of Economics and Law, Institute for International Political Economy (IPE)

Abstract: In this paper, the focus lies on the way the German government spends, how it spends and what the connection between finance ministry and central bank is. The institutions involved in the process are identified and discussed. As a member of the Eurozone, Germany's national central bank is not allowed to buy sovereign securities on its own account. The German government uses taxes and revenues from sovereign security issues to finance its spending, continuing the institutional framework that existed during the era of the deutsch mark. This description confirms the idea that 'the state spends first' also in the Eurozone and that it makes sense to consolidate central bank and government(s) even when a government is not issuing a sovereign currency.

Keywords: government spending; fiscal; monetary; Treasury; sovereign default; Eurozone (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B52 E42 E63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/215899/1/1694969355.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ipewps:1382020

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IPE Working Papers from Berlin School of Economics and Law, Institute for International Political Economy (IPE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().