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Spectrum licensing, policy instruments and market entry

Gary Madden, Erik Bohlin, Thien Tran and Aaron Morey

24th European Regional ITS Conference, Florence 2013 from International Telecommunications Society (ITS)

Abstract: Competition policy attempts to address the potential for market failure by encouraging competition in service markets. Often, in wireless communication service markets, national regulatory authorities seek to encourage entry via the spectrum assignment process. Instruments used include the assignment mode (auction or beauty contest), setting aside licenses and providing bidding (price and quantity) credits for potential entrants, and making more licenses (spectrum blocks) available than incumbent firms (excess licenses). The empirical analysis assesses the effectiveness of these policy instruments on encouraging entry. The econometric results show that the probability of entry is enhanced by using auction assignments and excess licenses. Furthermore, quantity, but not price, concessions encourage entry.

Keywords: spectrum licensing; policy instruments; market entry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-reg
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Spectrum Licensing, Policy Instruments and Market Entry (2014) Downloads
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