EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The effects of asymmetric regulation on the quality of broadband networks

Viktória Kocsis

24th European Regional ITS Conference, Florence 2013 from International Telecommunications Society (ITS)

Abstract: Network operators of competing infrastructures in European electronic communications markets face asymmetric regulation: incumbent telecommunications firms are required to open their networks for retail broadband competition, while cable companies have no such obligation. Furthermore, for historical reasons, cable companies have better quality networks thanks to the DOCSIS 3.0 technology than DSL-based telecom firms. How would the market structure of electronic communications markets and the quality of networks develop in the presence of asymmetric regulation and original quality differences? Based on a location model for product differentiation, i find that access revenues can compensate incumbent telecom firms for the loss due to having a lower quality network than cable companies. Therefore, access obligation reduces the incentives of telecom firms to compete with cable companies by upgrading network quality. In the absence of retail competitors without networks, however, telecom firms need to upgrade network quality to be able to remain competitive with cable companies. Furthermore and in line with the existing literature, the exclusion of retail competitors is more likely in the presence of higher access prices and stronger substitutuion between firms' products. Finally, if the original differences between network quality is large and high returns on investments are unlikely, telecom firms may not be able to invest sufficiently and lose substantially from their market shares.

Keywords: Telecommunications; Investments; Quality; Access regulation; Asymmetric regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K23 L10 L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ict, nep-ind, nep-net and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/88521/1/774033134.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:itse13:88521

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 24th European Regional ITS Conference, Florence 2013 from International Telecommunications Society (ITS)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:zbw:itse13:88521