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The value of punishment of free riders: A case study on the receiving fee system of the Japanese public broadcasting organization

Hisanobu Kakizawa

14th ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, Kyoto 2017: Mapping ICT into Transformation for the Next Information Society from International Telecommunications Society (ITS)

Abstract: Social preferences for the punishment of free riders are critical for generating cooperative behavior in human society. Focusing on the receiving fees of Japan´s public broadcaster, this study analyses how punishment of free riders, that is, the strengthening of legal responses against them, affects the willingness to pay (WTP) of general viewers. Preferences regarding punishments were found to have significant positive effects on WTP. Furthermore, differences of perception about the institutional framework around receiving fees and differences in type concerning cooperative behavior were found to influence these effects clearly.

Keywords: public goods; social preference; free riding; punishment; WTP (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 H41 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-law
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