The (in)elasticity of moral ignorance

Marta Serra-Garcia and Nora Szech

No 134, Working Paper Series in Economics from Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management

Abstract: Ignorance enables individuals to act immorally. This is well known in policy circles, where there is keen interest in lowering moral ignorance. In this paper, we demonstrate the relevance of demand elasticity to ignorance by showing that small monetary incentives can significantly reduce ignorance. We contrast monetary incentives with social norms, which have little impact on ignorance and actually increase ignorance in less moral individuals. Using a longitudinal design, we document that ignorance is persistent across moral contexts and through time. We propose and structurally estimate a simple behavioral model in line with our findings.

Keywords: information avoidance; morality; unethical behavior; social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D83 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/203248/1/1676193855.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The (In)Elasticity of Moral Ignorance (2022)
Working Paper: The (In)Elasticity of Moral Ignorance (2019)
Working Paper: The (In)Elasticity of Moral Ignorance (2019)
Working Paper: The (in)elasticity of moral ignorance (2019)
Working Paper: The (in)elasticity of moral ignorance (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:kitwps:134

DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000098636

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