A note on Condorcet consistency and the median voter

Berno Buechel
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Berno Büchel

No 17, Working Paper Series in Economics from Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management

Abstract: We discuss to which extent the median voter theorem extends to the domain of single-peaked preferences on median spaces. After observing that on this domain a Condorcet winner need not exist, we show that if a Condorcet winner does exist, then it coincides with the median alternative ('the median voter'). Based on this result, we propose two non-cooperative games that implement the unique strategy-proof social choice rule on this domain.

Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-pub
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Related works:
Working Paper: Condorcet winners on median spaces (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:kitwps:17

DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000022559

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