Axiomatic districting

Clemens Puppe () and Attila Tasnádi

No 24, Working Paper Series in Economics from Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management

Abstract: In a framework with two parties, deterministic voter preferences and a type of geographical constraints, we propose a set of simple axioms and show that they jointly characterize the districting rule that maximizes the number of districts one party can win, given the distribution of individual votes (the 'optimal gerrymandering rule'). As a corollary, we obtain that no districting rule can satisfy our axioms and treat parties symmetrically.

Keywords: districting; gerrymandering (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
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Journal Article: Axiomatic districting (2015)
Working Paper: Axiomatic districting (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:kitwps:24

DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000022998

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