Effective anti-corruption policy-making: What can we learn from experimental economics?

Amadou Boly and Robert Gillanders

No 9/2017, PEGNet Policy Briefs from PEGNet - Poverty Reduction, Equity and Growth Network, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: Experimental studies have shown that deterrence (monitoring and punishment) can be an effective anti-corruption policy. Even when they themselves stand to lose, policymakers may enact deterrence policies with real teeth ... However, policymakers' legitimacy is crucial: a given deterrence policy is more effective when chosen by an honest policymaker as opposed to a corrupt one.

Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dcm, nep-exp and nep-law
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:pegnpb:92017

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