Improving Efficiency and Equality in School Choice

Josue Ortega and Thilo Klein

No 2022/02, QBS Working Paper Series from Queen's University Belfast, Queen's Business School

Abstract: How should students be assigned to schools? Two mechanisms have been suggested and implemented around the world: deferred acceptance (DA) and top trading cycles (TTC). These two mechanisms are widely considered excellent choices owing to their outstanding stability and incentive properties. We show theoretically and empirically that both mechanisms perform poorly with regard to two key desiderata such as efficiency and equality, even in large markets. In contrast, the rank-minimizing mechanism is significantly more efficient and egalitarian. It is also Pareto optimal for the students, unlike DA, and generates less justified envy than TTC

JEL-codes: C78 D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:qmsrps:202202

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4089960

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