Common law and the origin of shareholder protection

Graeme G. Acheson, Gareth Campbell and John Turner ()

No 2016-04, QUCEH Working Paper Series from Queen's University Belfast, Queen's University Centre for Economic History

Abstract: This paper examines the origins of investor protection under the common law by analysing the development of shareholder protection in Victorian Britain, the home of the common law. In this era, very little was codified, with corporate law simply suggesting a default template of rules. Ultimately, the matter of protection was one for the corporation and its shareholders. Using c. 500 articles of association and ownership records of publicly-traded Victorian corporations, we find that corporations afforded investors with just as much protection as is present in modern corporate law and that firms with better shareholder protection had more diffuse ownership.

Keywords: law and finance; ADRI; shareholder protection; corporate ownership; common law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G34 G38 K22 N23 N43 N83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-his, nep-hpe and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Common law and the origin of shareholder protection (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:qucehw:201604

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