Are doctors better health ministers?

Adam Pilny and Felix Rösel
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Felix Roesel

No 849, Ruhr Economic Papers from RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen

Abstract: Appointing or electing professionals to be public officials is a double-edged sword. Experts can use their rich knowledge to implement reforms, but they can also favor their own profession. In this study, we compare physician-trained state health ministers to ministers of other professions in Germany during 1955-2017. German state health ministers have great power to determine hospital capacities and infrastructure. Our results show that physician-trained health ministers increase hospital capacities, capital, and funding by the statutory health insurance (SHI). This prompts hospitals to hire more physicians, but with little impact on hospital outputs. As a result, total factor productivity (TFP) growth in hospital care slows down substantially under physician-ministers. At the same time, job satisfaction of hospital doctors tends to increase. We conclude that, in particular, the medical profession benefits from medical doctors in office.

Keywords: Hospitals; health minister; productivity; TFP; favoritism; profession; technocracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 I11 I18 O47 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-hea and nep-ias
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Are Doctors Better Health Ministers? (2020)
Working Paper: Are Doctors Better Health Ministers? (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:rwirep:849

DOI: 10.4419/86788984

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