Taxes, banks and financial stability

Reint Gropp

No 6, SAFE White Paper Series from Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

Abstract: In this note, a new concept for a European deposit guarantee scheme is proposed, which takes account of the strong political reservations against a mutualization of the liability for bank deposits. The three-stage model for deposit insurance outlined in the text builds on existing national deposit guarantee schemes, offering loss compensation on a European level and at the same time preventing excessive risk and moral hazard taking by individual banks.

Keywords: bank risk; banking union; deposit insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-eec and nep-ias
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:safewh:6

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