Reset required: The euro area crisis management and deposit insurance framework
Thomas F. Huertas
No 85, SAFE White Paper Series from Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE
Abstract:
The crisis management and deposit insurance (CMDI) framework in the euro area requires a reset. Although its policy objectives remain valid, the means of achieving them do not. As the euro area comes the end of the long transition period taken to implement the BRRD/SRMR, it should take the opportunity to reset expectations about resolution. Above all, resolution should be for the many, not just the few. There should be a single presumptive path for dealing with failed banks: the use of bail-in to facilitate orderly liquidation under a solvent-wind down strategy. This will protect deposits and set the stage - together with the backstop that the European Stability Mechanism provides to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) -- for the transformation of the SRF into the Single Deposit Guarantee Scheme (SDGS). To avoid forbearance, responsibility for emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) should rest, not with national central banks, but with the ECB as a single lender of last resort. Finally, national deposit guarantee schemes should function as institutional protection schemes and become investors of last resort in their member banks. Together, these measures would complete Banking Union, promote market discipline, avoid imposing additional burdens on taxpayers, help untie the doom loop between weak banks and weak governments, strengthen the euro and enhance financial stability.
Keywords: Deposit Insurance; Crisis Management; BRRD; Resolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-eec and nep-ias
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:safewh:85
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