Asymmetric social norms

Gabriele Camera and Alessandro Gioffré

No 162, SAFE Working Paper Series from Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

Abstract: Studies of cooperation in infinitely repeated matching games focus on homogeneous economies, where full cooperation is efficient and any defection is collectively sanctioned. Here we study heterogeneous economies where occasional defections are part of efficient play, and show how to support those outcomes through contagious punishments

Keywords: cooperation; repeated games; social dilemmas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C6 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-soc
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/149240/1/877360685.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Asymmetric social norms (2017)
Working Paper: Asymmetric Social Norms (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:safewp:162

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2897466

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