Political science research on the reasons for the (non) adoption and (non) implementation of EMU reform proposals: The state of the art

Vincent Lindner, Sandra Eckert and Andreas Nölke

No 339, SAFE Working Paper Series from Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

Abstract: There have been numerous attempts to reform the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) after the Great Recession, however the reform success varies greatly among sub-fields. Additionally, the political science research community has engaged a diverse set of theory- driven explanations, causal mechanisms, and variables to explain respective reform success. This article takes stock of reform policies in the EMU from two angles. First, it outlines distinct theoretical approaches that seek to explain success and failure of reform proposals and second, it surveys how they explain policy output and policy outcome in four policy subfields: financial stabilization, economic governance, financial solidarity, and cooperative dissolution. Finally, the article develops a set of explanatory factors from the existing literature that will be used for a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA).

Keywords: Economic and Monetary Union; European integration; neoinstitutionalism; political economy; European Banking Union; European Capital Markets Union; economic governance; fiscal solidarity; policy reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:safewp:339

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4020327

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