Banking Union and the governance of credit institutions: A legal perspective

Jens-Hinrich Binder

No 96, SAFE Working Paper Series from Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

Abstract: The creation of the Banking Union is likely to come with substantial implications for the governance of Eurozone banks. The European Central Bank, in its capacity as supervisory authority for systemically important banks, as well as the Single Resolution Board, under the EU Regulations establishing the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism, have been provided with a broad mandate and corresponding powers that allow for far-reaching interference with the relevant institutions' organisational and business decisions. Starting with an overview of the relevant powers, the present paper explores how these could - and should - be exercised against the backdrop of the fundamental policy objectives of the Banking Union. The relevant aspects directly relate to a fundamental question associated with the reallocation of the supervisory landscape, namely: Will the centralisation of supervisory powers, over time, also lead to the streamlining of business models, corporate and group structures of banks across the Eurozone?

Keywords: Banking Union; Single Supervisory Mechanism; Single Resolution Mechanism; Banking Regulation; Bank Corporate Governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G15 G21 G28 K22 K23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-cfn, nep-eec and nep-law
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/109730/1/823282198.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:safewp:96

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2591817

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SAFE Working Paper Series from Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().