Does fiscal oversight matter?

Désirée Christofzik and Sebastian Kessing

No 01/2018, Working Papers from German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung

Abstract: A gradually introduced reform of local government accounting made it temporarily possible for municipalities in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia to avoid the effective control of their budget by the authorities in charge of overseeing local government budgets and enforcing the existing fiscal rules. Using this withdrawal of effective fiscal oversight, we identify the effects of fiscal restraints and their enforcement on fiscal outcomes. We find that the withdrawal of oversight has a significant and sizable effect on per capita debt of local governments that were previously constrained by fiscal oversight. Fiscal restraints are important, and oversight and enforcement are key requirements for their success.

Keywords: fiscal oversight; fiscal rules; local government debt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H72 H74 R50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/175274/1/1013617436.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Does fiscal oversight matter? (2018)
Working Paper: Does Fiscal Oversight Matter? (2018)
Working Paper: Does Fiscal Oversight Matter? (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:svrwwp:012018

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