Russia's catch-all nuclear rhetoric in its war against Ukraine: A balancing act between deterrence, dissuasion, and compellence strategies

Liviu Horovitz and Anna Clara Arndt

No 60/2022, SWP Comments from Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Abstract: A close reading of Russia's nuclear statements and actions during the first seven months of its war against Ukraine reveals a threefold approach. Moscow is walking a fine line between a well-crafted and successful deterrence strategy to prevent foreign military intervention; a more modest and rather unsuccessful attempt at dissuading foreign aid to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia; and incremental nuclear coercion against Kyiv that spurred Western deterrence messaging in response. This analysis reveals a careful Russian approach, suggesting that cost-benefit calculations are likely to continue to render nuclear escalation unlikely. However, nuclear use cannot be fully discounted, particularly if war-related developments severely imperil the survival of Russia's regime.

Keywords: Russia; invasion of Ukraine; nuclear deterrence; nuclear weapons; dissuasion; compellence; NATO; United States; military intervention; sanctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:swpcom:602022

DOI: 10.18449/2022C60

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