EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Risk and the role of collateral in debt renegotiation

Werner Neus and Manfred Stadler

No 16, University of Tübingen Working Papers in Business and Economics from University of Tuebingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, School of Business and Economics

Abstract: In his basic model of debt renegotiation, BESTER [1994] argues that collateral is more effective if high risk projects are financed. This result, however, crucially depends on the definition of risk. Using the second-order stochastic dominance criterion introduced by ROTHSCHILD AND STIGLITZ [1970], we show that it is not a project's high risk, induced by a high probability of default, that makes collateral more effective. Instead it turns out that, given the expected return, the probability of default has no impact on the collateral's effectiveness. Moreover, a higher risk of the project caused by a higher loss given default makes the use of collateral even less effective.

Keywords: Debt renegotiation; Collateral; Risk; Stochastic dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D82 G21 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-ppm, nep-rmg and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/48629/1/664820034.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Risk and the Role of Collateral in Debt Renegotiation (2013) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:tuewef:16

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in University of Tübingen Working Papers in Business and Economics from University of Tuebingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, School of Business and Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (econstor@zbw-workspace.eu).

 
Page updated 2025-03-31
Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuewef:16