Electoral Cycles in Active Labor Market Policies

Mario Mechtel and Niklas Potrafke

No 2, University of Tübingen Working Papers in Business and Economics from University of Tuebingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, School of Business and Economics

Abstract: We examine how electoral motives influence active labor market policies that promote job-creation. Such policies reduce unemployment statistics. Using German state data for the period 1985 to 2004, we show that election-motivated politicians pushed job-promotion schemes before elections.

Keywords: political business cycles; opportunistic politicians; active labor market policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E62 H61 H72 J08 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/45468/1/657433403.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Electoral cycles in active labor market policies (2013)
Working Paper: Electoral cycles in active labor market policies (2013)
Working Paper: Electoral Cycles in Active Labor Market Policies (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:tuewef:2

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in University of Tübingen Working Papers in Business and Economics from University of Tuebingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, School of Business and Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().