Should organizing premier-level European football be a monopoly? And who should run it? - An economists' perspective

Oliver Budzinski and Arne Feddersen

No 166, Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers from Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics

Abstract: The controversy around the breakaway European Super League, set to conquer the UEFA Champions League, and the surrounding antitrust proceedings revive the academic discussion about the monopoly power of sport-internal governing bodies (like the UEFA), the justification for and limits of their powers, and potential abuses of their power. Against this background, we discuss how much monopoly is unavoidable in premier-level European football and how its powers can be limited and, thus, scope and incentives for power abuse may be reduced. We particularly find that championship management can be periodically assigned to third-parties (like the Super League organizers) by tender procedures, thus, creating a periodical competition for the market, fueling innovation incentives and strengthening the influence of fans' preferences.

Keywords: sports economics; Super League; UEFA Champions League; monopoly; marketpower; sport associations; rival leagues (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D42 D47 K21 L12 L30 L40 L83 Z20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cul, nep-law, nep-reg and nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:166

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