Can occupational norms foster cooperative behavior? An experimental study comparing cooperation by military officers and civilians

Kirsten Johannemann, Karl Morasch and Marcus Wiens

No 2016,1, Working Papers in Economics from Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group

Abstract: In this experimental study we examine the behavior of Bundeswehr officers and officer candidates regarding their willingness to cooperate. Due to the military training which focuses on comradeship and reliable teamwork even under extreme conditions, we expect a strong bond between soldiers and therefore more cooperation among them. Furthermore there are additional norms for soldiers that explicitly call for social responsibility and an appropriate behavior relative to civilians. For that reason we also expect more altruism and trust of soldiers compared to pure civilian groups. To explore these issues in an experimental setting, the subjects had to play the dictator game, the ultimatum game, and the trust game. These three established experiments allow us to measure and distinguish between different aspects of social and cooperative motivation. We find that soldiers are on average more altruistic, more cooperative, and more trusting as well as more trustworthy. These results do not only hold for the interaction among soldiers but in most cases also with regard to the behavior of soldiers towards civilians.

Keywords: Experiment; Dictator Game; Ultimatum Game; Trust Game; Cooperative Behavior; Professional Norms; Military (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 C91 D01 D63 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ubwwpe:20161

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