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Deeds rather than omissions: How intended consequences provoke negative reciprocity

Manuel Schubert ()

No V-65-12, Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe from University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics

Abstract: Intention-based models of reciprocity argue that people assess kindness by measuring the intended consequences of actual behavior (deeds) against foregone payoffs resulting from unchosen alternatives (omissions). While the effects of omissions have been intensively studied in recent years, less has been done with respect to the impact of deeds on reciprocation. I employ a novel game that alters the intended consequences behind actual behavior at constant levels of unchosen alternatives and realized payoffs. Aggregate results suggest that intended consequences only weakly matter for negative reciprocity. I find men to abstain from retaliation when others intend to mildly harm them. Women, however, seem to be largely invariant to intended consequences of actual behavior.

Keywords: intentions; reciprocity; kindness; gender (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C91 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:upadvr:v6512

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