Political Economy of Banking Regulation
Florian Buck and
Eva Schliephake ()
VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association
Abstract:
The paper argues that national regulators can improve the stability of the domestic banking sector via two substitutable policy instruments; minimum capital requirements and effort spend on domestic supervision. Both tools increase the soundness of a national banking system, but they imply different cost burdens between domestic banks and taxpayers. The optimal domestic policy choice is characterised by trading off marginal costs and benefits born by each party. However, the optimal policy choice changes if banks are allowed to be mobile. We show that countries are better off by harmonising capital requirements on an international standard la Basel, since harmonisation counters a regulatory race with other jurisdictions and will increase national utility.
JEL-codes: D78 G18 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-pol and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc12:62018
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