Information Disclosure in Dynamic Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions: An Empirical Study

Sebastian Stoll and Gregor Zöttl

VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: The outcome of non-binding reverse auctions critically depends on how information is distributed during the bidding process. We use data from a large European procurement platform to study the impact of different information structures, specifically the availability of quality information to the bidders, on buyers welfare and platform turnovers. First we show that on the procurement platform considered bidders indeed are aware of their rivals characteristics and the buyers preferences over those non-price characteristics. In a counterfactual analysis we then analyze the reduction of non-price information available to the bidders. As we find, platform turnovers would decrease from around 10 million euros to around 7 million euros and the buyers welfare would increase by the monetary equivalent of around 2.7 million euros.

JEL-codes: D44 D82 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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