The Role of Lawyer-Legislators in Shaping the Law: Evidence from Voting Behavior on Tort Reforms

Ulrich Matter and Alois Stutzer

VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: Attorneys elected to the US House of Representatives and to US state legislatures are systematically less likely to vote in favor of tort reforms that restrict tort litigation, but more likely to support bills that extend tort law. This finding is based on the analysis of 54 votes at the federal and state level between 1995 and 2012. It holds when controlling for legislators ideology and is particularly strong for term-limited lawyer-legislators. The empirical regularity is consistent with the hypothesis that lawyer- legislators, at least in part, pursue their private interests when voting on tort issues. Our results highlight the relevance of legislators identities and individual professional interests for economic policy making.

JEL-codes: C81 D72 K13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-law and nep-pol
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/100452/1/VfS_2014_pid_148.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Role of Lawyer-Legislators in Shaping the Law: Evidence from Voting Behavior on Tort Reforms (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc14:100452

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